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Abstract
In this response to Martin’s “Should Deliberate Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?” I examine
Martin’s comments against the “argument from circumspection,” which is dubious regarding the
claims children make to change democratic policies and procedures. I explain there are good reasons
for being circumspect. One of these concerns the need for all in public discourse to supply not just
claims but reasons and to have both these claims and reasons adjudicated in the logical space of reasons. Children, as with all who practice public discourse, must have their claims and reasons assessed
for these to be admitted as candidates for changing policies and procedures. This augurs for a case-by-
case inclusion of children, as opposed to a wholesale one.
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Introduction

n “Should Deliberative Democratic Inclusion Extend
to Children?” Martin (2018) claimed philosophical interest
in the ways in which children may be justifiably excluded
from voting. Martin noted two (philosophical) problems in the act
of justifiable exclusion. The first is the generalization problem: arguments that draw on the lack of knowledge could be applied as well
to adults (p. 1). The second is the circumspection problem: undue
caution with which we assign weight to the preferences of children
informing political decisions (p. 2). Overcoming these problems in
accounts of deliberative democracy involves and invokes the
epistemic features of these, and Martin spent a good deal of time
demonstrating the epistemic conditions in and under which such
accounts must operate.
Martin (2018) quickly moved from the failure of justification
of certain quasi-developmental accounts of political theory
regarding the child to solve generalization and circumspection
democracy & education, vol 27, n-o 1

problems, to self-consciously deliberative accounts. In the former
case, Martin gave examples of Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and
Lawrence Kohlberg (Martin, 2018, p. 5). In these latter, what
counts as epistemic principle, epistemic inclusion, and epistemic
reason took center stage (Martin, 2018, pp. 8–9). Sorting this
terminology out is a chief feature of this section of his essay.
Martin claimed epistemic principle as the principle of proportionality of inclusion of preferences of those affected in the
decision-making procedure (Martin, 2018, p. 8) and the “epistemic principle of children’s political inclusion” as that principle
of epistemic value of children’s preferences to that of any other

James Scott Johnston is jointly appointed associate professor in
the faculty of education and the department of philosophy in the
Memorial University of Newfoundland. He has published several
books on John Dewey, Immanuel Kant, and philosophy of
education.
article response

1

constituency (Martin, 2018, p. 8).1 With these terms defined,
Martin began to assemble an argument for overcoming the
problems of generalization and especially circumspection.
In the next section, Martin (2018) canvassed the political
literature in an attempt to overcome these problems; he looked at
deliberative democratic arguments from the distinctness of
children (pp. 11–12), public understanding (pp. 12–13), and
nondenomination (pp. 14–15). It turns out none of these adequately
capture the nature of the problems, nor do they solve them; indeed,
the problem of circumspection in particular, pointed up by the
asymmetry of adult versus children’s deliberative preferences,
proves to be a valuable reminder for deliberative democrats that we
must have children’s long-term interests in mind when responding
to their preferences. Martin followed James Bohlman’s work on
asymmetry in this regard. Martin’s thesis at the end of the section is
that children should be granted epistemic inclusion and their
preferences should be treated as independent sources and claims of
what is fair and just (p. 16).
Martin (2018) then turned his attention to the aims of
schooling (p. 16). Martin drew on Miranda Fricker’s work regarding epistemic injustices and minorities, injustices of testimony, and
interpretation (credibility and understanding) in the contestation
of the citizen (p. 17).2 Circumspection, which Martin cautiously
endorsed, must be shown to avoid the epistemic injustice of
discrimination against preferences simply because the preferences
are from children (p. 18). We must take children’s preferences
seriously if we are to educate in deliberative, democratic schools,
and taking children’s preferences seriously thereby becomes an aim
of the school (p. 19). Martin thought the problem of circumspection, which turns out to be a problem of reach (too much versus too
little) is ameliorated when schools take children seriously as
epistemic members of the community (p. 19).

Part One: The Role of the Epistemic
Here I want to delve more deeply into Martin’s (2018) various uses
of epistemic, with the intention of developing a coherent and
comprehensive understanding of the term. This will be important
in what follows, for Martin’s use and understanding of epistemic
does a great deal of the heavy lifting in turning the circumspection
problem to an advantage, and to the overall plausibility of the
deliberative, democratic approach to schools. To be clear, I am
discussing epistemic in regards Martin’s position from democratic
1 I think this sets Martin up to overemphasize the consequentialist evaluation of claims, to the detriment of the inferential (logical)
evaluations. Indeed, it seems there is little role for fitting claims, and
the reasons behind those claims, in something like ‘the logical space of
reasons,’ to be adjudicated there for fit.
2 In a view of epistemic inclusion that ignores the inferential latticework that constitutes the logical space of reasons making up public discourse. She has made consequential arguments (arguments for changes
in the practical discourse) primary and inferential licensing (assessment
of claims for their suitability as reasons in public discourse) secondary.
Indeed, inferential gatekeeping seems dependent on consequentialist arguments in Fricker’s handling of the two. I reverse the order. My reasons
for this are laid out in part two.
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deliberation and the broader emphasis on justice as fairness that
this implies and not attempting to articulate a robust philosophical
account of justification. I pick up Martin’s argument for “epistemic
inclusion” beginning on pages 7–8 of the article. Epistemic
justification in the context of deliberative democratic theory has to
do with the giving and taking of reasons “as a means to public
agreement” (p. 4). Martin followed Amy Gutmann and Jürgen
Habermas here. Democratic deliberation “enhances epistemic
quality of political decisions made in the interests of justice and
fairness” (p. 4). From this, an “epistemic principle of political
inclusion” (p. 5) can be generated. This is, “the likelihood that a
political decision is successful increases as we include the perspectives of those affected in the decision-making procedure” (p. 5).
Furthermore, an “epistemic principle of political inclusion” can be
directed to children: “The epistemic principle of children’s political
inclusion: the inclusion of children is an epistemically valuable as
the inclusion of any other constituency affected by a political
decision” (p. 5). The willingness of an individual or group affected
by a decision is more likely to make an “epistemic contribution” if
they are included in deliberation than otherwise (p. 8). Indeed, this
is the practical point of deliberative, democratic theory. Martin
called this the “contribution premise” (pp. 8–9).
But this invokes a legitimate reaction. Martin (2018) continued: that “everyone’s participation is epistemically helpful is simply
an overstatement, because we know from experience that some
people in fact do not make relevant contributions to deliberation”
(p. 9). He claimed:
The development of the best available argument is what deliberation is
about, on an epistemic view, and this requires claims to be assessed for
their merits. But even then, arguments found to be wanting are still
epistemically valuable. For example, unconvincing but well-crafted
and well-intended arguments can shape our collective knowledge and
understanding of a political norm or decision by refining our sense
of what is justifiable and what is not, or be sensitizing us to points of
view we had not considered fully beforehand. These “failed”
arguments can serve as bridges to more successful ones. (p. 5)

We are beginning to get an understanding of the role that “epistemic” plays in “epistemic inclusion.” It is not enough for agents to
put forward their preferences in the public space; these preferences
must be cast in such a way that they can be agreed upon. The space
of agreement is equally the space of deliberation; that is to say, it is
the space of public justification. And what is put forward in the
space of public justification are the individual’s preferences but not
for immediate consumption and resultant social change, rather, for
deliberation. Still, it turns out that even poorly argued or ill-fitting
preferences are granted at least some significance in terms of their
overall capacity to shape the public deliberation.
Therefore, we can justify an epistemic principle of inclusion supported
by the contribution premise without denying that deliberative ability
varies across individuals and groups. All that variability tells us is that
once included, some arguments will be articulated with more skill by
some than others. But all such arguments are more likely to make a
contribution if they are included than excluded. (p. 5)
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Martin moved with facility from the “contribution premise,”
whereby an individual or group is more likely to participate in a
deliberative public, given the opportunity, to the conclusion that
the individual or group ought to participate regardless of the
particular preference (and the personal justification with which it
is accompanied) and that this particular preference is more likely
to make a contribution.
Let us see what “epistemic inclusion” consists of thus far. It
includes democratic deliberation, taking place in a public field or
sphere, in which agents (individuals or groups) present their
preferences, ostensibly couched in the form of reasons (inclusive of
personal justifications); these preferences are freely proposed
(under no coercion), with no presumptive obstructions or hurdles
on the part of the public, many of which may not ultimately
influence public deliberation yet are likely to encourage ongoing
participation and make a contribution to democracy. Martin
(2018) endorsed the force of this understanding, because:
epistemic inclusion means that we must accord presumptive epistemic
value to the reasons that our fellow citizens offer in practical
discourse, giving them time and opportunity to test those reasons
against other arguments and points of view. To do otherwise would
be an act of exclusion, and an epistemically bad act at that. But what
about children? (p. 10).

Martin claimed we ought to extend this notion of “epistemic
inclusion” to children, and in so doing, make children valuable
participants in deliberative democratic theory and practices.
Martin (2018) then brought this set of claims back to the
“argument from circumspection.” We have seen that this argument
posits adults as in the best position to make epistemic claims on
children’s knowledge: children, unlike adults, are said “to be known
to not know” and therefore cannot be made participants in
deliberative democratic theory and practices. Martin, of course,
refused this claim (p. 10). It turns out that children are more likely
to participate in future deliberation if given the opportunity to do
so when young and therefore ought to participate when young. So
much for the argument from circumspection. With the way
forward, Martin was able to turn to the schools and the practical
upshot of the “epistemic inclusion” of children.
Martin’s (2018) argument has intuitive appeal. It obviously makes
sense that children (and indeed, all of those who would participate in a
deliberative democratic process) align their present participation
with future participation and that present participation is encouragement for ongoing presence in the public sphere. It seems to me
this is a consequentialist claim, and to the degree that it is evidentially sound (that research backs it up), it should go forward.
However, there is slippage in Martin’s argument that I foresee as
masking a larger, philosophical chasm between consequentialists
(who will like the argument as it stands) and others, who will
(rightly, I think) question the role that the “ought” is doing in
moving us from children expressing their preferences to the
acceptance of these preferences as adjusting the shared deliberative
world of public discourse. The matter comes down to this: Even
admitting that there are good consequentialist arguments for
children participating in deliberative democratic discourses, ought
democracy & education, vol 27, n-o 1

we to take their preferences, and the reasons they give for them,
seriously? I think we must be careful here and not accept them
holus-bolus: I think we must take them one by one. Thus, I am not
willing to give up the claim that we should be cautious of children’s
preferences unless and until it be shown that children’s preferences
and the reasons behind them are publically defendable, epistemically justifiable, and socially cogent. And, contrary to Martin’s
dismissal of the argument (p. 10), I don’t think he wants to give this
up either. To show that this is the case, in part two, I take my
departure from the “argument from circumspection,” as Martin
characterized it, briefly turn to Martin’s earlier writing on the
topics of discourse morality and dialogicality, and then return to
the linguistic-inferential and dialogical context invoked in
allowing children to modify the deliberative, democratic public
discourse.

Part Two: Discourse Morality, Epistemic Justification, and the
Inclusion of Children
In nontranscendental accountings of morality, what makes
morality of a public nature moral is its susceptibility of discursive
justification. Martin here and elsewhere has ruled out transcendental justifications of public morality (Martin, 2012, p. 89; 2018, p. 3):
he is therefore left with justification in and through public discourse (Martin, 2012, p. 92). This discourse is epistemic insofar as:
As an individual, I cannot decide on behalf of others that all could
agree to my proposed action or policy; rather, I claim that a proposed
norm or policy could be agreed to and defended as such in rational
public discourse. This is the epistemic meaning of my claim. (Martin,
2012, p. 92)

When we put forward our preferences, we put forward a claim that
is suitable for both agreement and defense in public
deliberation—the claim may in fact be far from epistemic suitability; nevertheless, we, as members of a public discourse, are entitled
to put claims forward that we think are suitable for acceptance.
We acknowledge the truth of our claim in moving it forward,
and we are aware of the need for the acknowledgment of others in
so doing. Others are aware that we are aware, and we are aware that
others are aware. This is the basis of the social recognition inherent
in discourse communities theorized from Hegel to the present. It is
this awareness that must be developed by children to participate
fully in discourse communities.3
The rational public discourse Martin (2012) spoke of in
Education in a Post-Metaphysical World is the logical space of
(discursive) reasons. In the Habermasian, Sellarsian, and
Brandomian senses of this domain, reasons are claims given and
taken, and justification is broadly dependent on a stock of prior
reasons built up of previous discourse yet available to us as a
3 While Martin rejected quasi-developmental accounts of children as
having insufficient learning to participate in discursive communities,
he did not, I think, reject the solidity of the claims of social recognition,
together with its long historical provenance. Much practice takes place in
mastering a language, and this involves recognition of being recognized
and recognizing others in turn.
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quasi-intuitive context of discursive operations. When we put our
claims forward, we recognize that they are claims, that they are up
for debate and dialogue, even as we strongly support their cogency
and coherency (our belief about them). Thus, in entering into a
dialogue with claims, we anticipate their cogency and their
capacity as reasons in a deliberative, justificatory process. In other
words, when we enter into a dialogue with claims, we already do so
in full view of their operation as reasons. Regardless of whether or
not further inferential claims accompany our claims and assertions
(consider “it is hotter in this spot” versus “it is hotter in this spot
because the sun is directly over me”), as taken up in public discourse, they are understood to be accompanied by, and susceptible
of, further reasons.
Those who wish to enter into public discourse and dialogue
do so through putting claims forward. This includes every participant, young and old, having strong or diminished faculties, lucid or
otherwise. To put forward a claim is to either supply, or be on
the hook for, reasons as to why the claim should be accepted. The
“argument from circumspection” is not only suspicious of those
who are very young, have diminished faculties, or are other than
lucid, it pronounces a negative verdict on the claims of these not
having heard the reasons behind them. This is a species of prejudice,
for it licenses dismissal of claims regardless of whether cogent
reasons are supplied or not.4 Applied to children, the “argument
from circumspection,” at least in this strong form, is prejudicial
and antithetical to deliberative discourse as a means to proper
justification.
However, there is a weaker sense of the “argument from
circumspection” that might be more cogent and, in any event,
stands in the way of the full-scale acceptance of children’s claims
to be taken seriously in public deliberation. We have said that
claims put forward in public discourse are to be accompanied by,
or at least susceptible of, further reasons. I take it this applies
equally to all who put claims forward, including those who are very
young, have diminished faculties, or are other than lucid. Putting a
claim forward demands attention and recognition of the act of
claim-staking. It demands asking over and assessing reasons. This
is a public activity, in which reasons are deliberated upon along
with the claim. But of course, it also depends upon context and
circumstances, that vast repertory of inferences that is swung into
operation in assessing claims. These inferences serve to justify the
cogency of the present claim, and if the present claim cannot be
justified by and through these inferences, the claim fails as
normative prerogative (Martin, 2018, p. 25).5 Justification is a
quasi-intuitive operation, in which the new claim is brought up
against already-existing linguistic-inferential discursive practices;
4 For Kant, prejudice “is the mechanism of reason in principles” and is
“a principium for judging based on subjective causes that are regarded as
objective” (Kant 1781/1992, p. 314). Moving from prejudice to objective
judging involves practice in giving (objective) reasons for one’s claims
and assertions; dismissal of claims without having heard the reasons
behind them is tantamount to judging based on subjective causes.
5 In Martin’s estimation, the account I am putting forward would count
as a “constructivist epistemic conception,” following Martin (2006).
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it is a licensing, in which the claim is assessed as to its inferential
coherence, its hanging-together logically with other existing
reasons and admitted or rejected on this basis. Beyond this, a more
pragmatic evaluation of the claim’s consequences for both linguistic and behavioral (including political and policy) practices can be
ascertained.
Martin’s (2018) conclusion with respect to “epistemic inclusion” was that “we must accord presumptive epistemic value to
the reasons that our fellow citizens offer in practical discourse”
(p. 5, italics mine). I heartily concur. But this means distinguishing
the claims our fellow citizens offer from the reasons they proffer in
making those claims. Doubtless, the claim and the reasons for the
claim are conjoined. But we must pull them apart enough to see
how well they operate together. It is not enough to simply put
forward the claims of citizens, adult or child. We must also ask over
and ascertain the reasons they put these claims forth. We do this by
subjecting individual claims to the network of inferentially
licensed reasons. On this reading, some claims will be intuitively
indefensible. Consider the case of open bigotry. The dismissal of
someone’s opinion on the basis of their skin color (e.g., “I don’t
believe her because she’s Black”) will be thought of as indefensible
because no cogent inferentially licensed reason will be available to
support it, and this from the get-go. And this is not because the
initial claims are taken up in public deliberation and painstakingly assessed by various stakeholders in discourse; rather, it is
quasi-intuitively false, largely owing to a history of debates on the
matter in which strong reasons have been put forward. Merely
bringing this claim forth as a reason is already to have violated the
“epistemic inclusion” clause.
Martin (2018) insisted that schools have an obligation to
develop and foster an environment where children can become
deliberative agents through educational opportunities for democratic deliberation (p. 18). Following Fricker, Martin distinguished
epistemic justice from “formative epistemic injustice,” a condition
that takes root when children’s competence to develop the means
to “successfully contest norms and policies within deliberation”
(p. 9). Examples Martin gave include unwillingness to help
children in developing this competence, treating their claims as
mere information, and taking condescending attitudes toward
their claims (p. 18). But I suggest that we disentangle the claims
children put forth from the reasons for them doing so. We do this
by subjecting their claims to inferentially licensed reasons. It will
turn out that at least some of the reasons children give do not meet
the requirements of this inferential licensing and should be
rejected as quasi-intuitively false. This does not, pace Fricker,
violate epistemic justice. And it does not because it denies that
justice resides in acceptance of children’s claims; rather, justice lies
in their licensing through existing inferences. This does not
conflict with Martin’s broader claim that schools are responsible to
develop and foster the environment where children can become
deliberative agents; rather, it shifts the locus of what counts as
licensed deliberative outcomes from claims to reasons.
An empirical survey of children’s claims regarding success in
justification and consequences in respect of political changes
suited to their demands has never, to my mind, been conducted.
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Nevertheless, if it were, I worry a good percentage of the claims put
forward would be intuitively unsupportable and immediately in
violation of the “epistemic inclusion” clause. It cannot be the case
that a mere claim, put forward, is entitled to obvious and immediate entrance into the logical space of reasons. It cannot be the case
until it has been quasi-intuitively assessed as to its cogency and
coherence with existing reasons, and this means the reasons for its
being put forth must be evaluated. This is not to denigrate the
claims or reasons children give; such scepticism cannot be
warranted on a philosophical accounting alone, as it would require
an empirical survey. It is rather a reminder that when claims are
put forward, they are quasi-intuitively justified through recourse to
a logical-discursive-inferential network formed of reasons given in
previous (social) public deliberations. Not only claims but reasons
for those claims are susceptible of evaluation and asking for
reasons when claims are put forth is central to the practice of
justification.
However, it may be objected that setting up the logical space
of reasons this way is to transform it into a gauntlet through which
claims must successfully pass if they are to be accorded the
standing of justification: this would serve to inhibit the ethical
force of these claims, by constraining the subjective, emotional
conditions from which these claims were generated, and in many
cases, bring with them. On this reading, the space of reasons, as the
epistemic, inferentially licensed set of reasons that controls
justification of claims in public discourse, makes no room for, and
conveys no validity to, arguments from subjectivity, including
emotion. Yet such a conclusion would be premature. Such justification does not deny or even limit the putting forth of claims to those
claims and accompanying reasons that are nonsubjective (i.e.,
assessable by all); it only limits the justification of those claims to
those that are objectively assessable. Only if a subjective claim is
put forward with subjective reason(s) (operating as a ground) as its
basis is the claim rejected as inadmissible. A claim with emotional
content or subjective reasons can be put forward; however, the
objective content (legitimate inferentially licensed reasons) of the
claim alone will be assessed for validity. It is an old argument, still
valid, running from Kant to Habermas and beyond, that private,
subjective claims (arguments to emotion and to private circumstances) cannot by themselves be the material for objective, public
assessment; claims must be publically available (objective) for
them to be assessed as justifiable in light of public interests. An
attitude of circumspection must prevail. Just what the inferences
contain that makes them suitable for the act of justifying claims is a
matter beyond the scope of this paper, though it is a source of great
concern.6
6 I follow broadly Kant, Sellars, Habermas, and Brandom in specifying
the public nature of all claims put forward for assessment in discursive
practices. I fully recognize the variability of foundations for such a
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Notice that the circumspection of inferential licensing of
claims put forth is not the only licensing that takes place. Provided
inferential licensing to ensure the public availability of claims has
taken place, there is then the matter of consequential licensing.
Once the claim is fit for public discourse, the consequences of the
claim, inclusive of the reasons the claim is put forward, are up for
adjudication. These consequences form the standard anticipatory
effects of the practical implementation of the claim. But it is
important that consequential analysis follows, not precedes,
inferential licensing. If the claim and the reasons put forward for
the claim cannot be shown to be publically available (cannot be
shown to fit in the logical space of reasons), then the claim does not
proceed.
Epistemic inclusion of children, therefore, must include the
reasons for claims put forward if these reasons are to be taken
seriously, together with their accompanying assertions influencing
public dialogue, debate, and practices. This means that children’s
claims should be taken seriously but only when accompanied by
reasons and only if those reasons jibe with the quasi-intuitive
framework of inferences that forms the web of logical reasons in
linguistic, dialogic, public practices. Only then can the consequences of the claims, should they be brought forward and made
operational, be ascertained. The call to be circumspect makes sense
only if it references this web of inferences, itself composed of
reasons. But bearing this in mind, circumspection is a healthy
disposition and, I might add, a good idea for dealing not just with
children but all linguistic and social actors. In this regard, I believe
Martin (2018) would concur.
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nature these, and others, rely on in making their claims. From the
transcendental (Kant) to the weakly transcendental (Habermas) to
the strictly linguistic-ideal (Brandom), a range of possibilities emerges.
I take it, though, that no one foundation need be appealed to in making
the broader argument to publicity.
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